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state tax notes®
A New Theory of Equitable Apportionment
by David Gamage and Darien Shanske

David Gamage is a professor of law at
Indiana University Maurer School of Law, and
Darien Shanske is a professor at the University
of California, Davis, School of Law (King Hall).
In this edition of Academic Perspectives on
SALT, the authors discuss the purpose of
equitable apportionment, arguing that it
remains coherent in the context of single-salesfactor apportionment regimes.
There is a lot of ferment surrounding equitable
apportionment under section 18 of the Uniform
Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act.1 The
Multistate Tax Commission has made revisions to
2
section 18 and is considering more, and there are
many recent controversial equitable apportionment
3
cases — most notably Vodafone in Tennessee. Issues

in controversy include who bears the burden of
proof, what that burden is, and how and whether to
4
deal with specific industries and issues.
At least in theory, equitable apportionment
provides state tax authorities with a crucial tool for
combatting taxpayers’ attempts to game multistate
apportionment formulas.5 According to Lee
A. Sheppard of Tax Analysts: “Section 18 was
intended to be a broad grant of authority to state tax
administrators to change the apportionment
method for a taxpayer whose method did not fairly
reflect in-state activity. It is meant to be applied
sparingly. But there is a fear that the single-salesfactor rules adopted by many states are causing
6
more alternative adjustments.”
Here, we address a single but broad question:
What is the purpose of equitable apportionment
in the age of the single sales factor? Contrary to
what has been suggested by some other leading
state tax experts, we argue that equitable
apportionment remains coherent and useful even
within the context of single-sales-factor
apportionment regimes.
But first, let us consider contrary views.
Notably, SALT luminary Richard Pomp of the
University of Connecticut Law School, author of
the MTC hearing officer’s report that contained
many of the sensible proposals to reform section
18, stated in that report that “from a tax policy
perspective, the single sales factor is virtually
7
indefensible.”

1

See, e.g., Roxanne Bland, “UDITPA Section 18 and Alternative
Apportionment Formulas,” State Tax Notes, May 15, 2017, p. 675;
and Christopher T. Lutz et al., “Trends and Developments in
Alternative Apportionment of State Income,” State Tax Notes, May
8, 2017, p. 559.
2

Amy Hamilton, “MTC Restarts Work on Alternative
Apportionment Model Regulations,” State Tax Notes, Sept. 12, 2016,
p. 850.
3

Vodafone v. Roberts, 486 S.W.3d 496 (Tenn. 2016). For critical
discussion see Lutz et al., supra note 1; and Peter L. Faber,
“Inequitable Apportionment: A Bad Precedent in Tennessee,” State
Tax Notes, Apr. 25, 2016, p. 277.

4

See, e.g., Lutz et al., supra note 1.

5

It is also a tool for taxpayers to counter unreasonable results.
Though that aspect of equitable apportionment is not the focus of
this article, we do not mean to suggest that it is less important. We
hope to return to considering equitable apportionment from the
taxpayer’s perspective in a future article.
6

Sheppard, “News Analysis: Shoring Up UDITPA Section 18,”
State Tax Notes, Aug. 4, 2014, p. 310.
7

Report of the Hearing Officer [Richard Pomp] Multistate Tax
Compact Article IV [UDITPA], at 14 (Oct. 25, 2013).
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To a substantial degree, we consider Pomp’s
argument to be both empirically and theoretically
compelling. As an empirical matter, it is certainly
the case that states did not shift to single sales
factor to more accurately locate multistate
businesses’ income. Rather, states have adopted
single sales factor because of the belief that this
would make their home industries more
8
competitive.
Moreover, as a matter of theory, it is hard to
understand how single sales factor could be an
improvement on ascertaining where income is
produced. It would be one thing to quibble with
how much a company’s payroll contributes to its
income relative to its sales, but it is quite another
to give payroll no weight at all. How could it
make sense for a state that housed all of a
corporation’s payroll to have no income
apportioned to that state simply because all of the
corporation’s sales are in other states? So, if Pomp
is correct in arguing that formulary
apportionment using the single sales factor is
indefensible on policy grounds, what is there for
equitable apportionment to correct if a state has
adopted single sales factor?
Accordingly, as reported by Tax Analysts’
Amy Hamilton, “former MTC Chair Bruce
Johnson, now with Taxometry LLC, said section
18 ‘really doesn’t work anymore’ because it
speaks in terms of factors that fail to fairly reflect
a company’s business activity in a state. In a state
that has gone to single-sales-factor
apportionment, he said, it would be easy to put an
economist on the stand and say that a formula
that completely disregards all of a company’s
property and payroll does not fairly reflect the
business activity in the state.”9 Rick Handel,
another prominent commentator, then takes the

next logical step and argues that states should be
prepared to default back to the traditional three10
factor formula in some section 18 cases.
Nevertheless, contrary to those views, we
argue that single-sales-factor apportionment is
not incoherent and that therefore, there is a proper
use for equitable apportionment within singlesales-factor apportionment regimes. To develop
our argument, we need to step back and consider
just what kind of tax the state corporate income
tax (CIT) has become in the era of single-salesfactor apportionment. Building on a seminal
argument made by Charles McLure,11 one of us
(Shanske) has argued elsewhere that there is an
important way in which the double shift to single
sales factor and market-based sourcing of sales,
including services and intangibles, has changed
12
the nature of the CIT. The simple version of that
argument is as follows: The more a corporation —
say Amazon.com — sells in a state, the more of its
income will be taxable in that state. Say that the
state is California and that the relevant CIT rate is
10 percent. Then Amazon would be paying a 10
percent tax on the net income from its sales into
California.
To be sure, matters are not that simple. The
analytic core of the argument (developed in more
depth elsewhere13) is that, based on reasonable
assumptions, corporations experience increased
CIT liability at the margin as a product of
increased sales, rather than as a product of
increased profits.
Here is an example to illustrate the point.
Imagine that Corporation Z has a 10 percent
sales factor in California and earns a $20

10

Handel, “Using UDITPA Section 18 in South Carolina and
Beyond,” State Tax Notes, July 27, 2015, p. 349. Philip Morris
recently petitioned California’s Franchise Tax Board for the use of a
more traditional formula, arguing that the single sales factor did
not fairly represent the sources from which the taxpayer derived its
income. The petition was heard on June 15, 2017. The petition and
the FTB response are available at https://www.ftb.ca.gov/law/
meetings/06152017/8.pdf. Our understanding is that the petition
was rejected. The argument of this essay strongly suggests that this
was the right result, at least in the abstract.
11

8

See, e.g., the ballot argument for California’s Proposition 39,
which instituted mandatory single-sales-factor apportionment.
9

Hamilton, “MTC Alternative Apportionment Group
Grappling With Sourcing Issues,” State Tax Notes, Mar. 7, 2016, p.
705.
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Charles E. McLure Jr., “The State Corporate Income Tax:
Lambs in Wolves’ Clothing,” In the Economics of Taxation, edited by
Henry J. Aaron and Michael J. Boskin (1980), at 327; and Shanske,
“A New Theory of the State Corporate Income Tax: The State
Corporate Income Tax as Retail Sales Tax Complement,” 66 Tax Law
Review 305 (2013).
12
13

Shanske, supra note 11, at 321-22.
Id. at 344-48.
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million profit on $100 million of sales
nationally. Assuming California has a 10
percent CIT rate, then Corporation Z’s tax
liability in California is $200,000. Now suppose
that Corporation Z makes $1 million in new
sales in California, on which it will earn
$100,000 in net income (a return of 10 percent).
What happens to Corporation Z’s CIT liability
to California? It is now $218,911 (10.89 percent
[higher sales factor] x $20.1 million [higher net
income] x 10 percent). If not for the single sales
factor, how much would Corporation Z owe
California? Only $201,000 or (10 percent x 10
percent x $20.1 million). And so almost 95
percent of Corporation Z’s higher liability to
California is attributed to its new sales in
California and not to its higher profits. This
makes sense because the full value of its new
sales went into the sales factor relative to the
net income from the sale. The final assumption
here is that the corporation can and will pass
this additional cost on to the consumer, as it
would a sales tax.
It is also worth noting that in the age of
Quill, a CIT with single-sales-factor
apportionment reaches a good portion of sales
that the retail sales tax does not, at least for
states with a substantial economic presence
test for the CIT. And there is another reason
that the new CIT reaches more sales than retail
sales taxes: Sales of services and intangibles
count toward the sales factor, even though
those sales are often not subject to state retail
sales taxes.
To be sure, the CIT with single-sales-factor
apportionment is — at best — a poorly
designed consumption tax merged with a
poorly designed business income tax. There is
no good reason why a corporation with high
profit margins (that is, high income) should in
effect be pushing more tax onto its consumers
relative to a low (that is, low income)
corporation. And why should only
consumption through corporations be taxed?
Those problems should not be minimized.
Yet consider the typical state retail sales tax by
comparison. The typical retail sales tax does

not reach huge swathes of consumption —
namely services and intangibles — and
overtaxes some sectors because of pyramiding.
Nevertheless, commentators do not say that
those flaws mean that the retail sales tax is not
a consumption tax. Rather, they say that retail
sales taxes are poorly designed consumption
taxes.14 We say that the same is true of CITs
with single-sales-factor apportionment.
What are the implications? One, a CIT with
a single sales factor is clearly not incoherent,
but just another poorly designed state-level
consumption tax. Second, there is nothing
inherently problematic with an origin state
having no income apportioned to it. This
means that a corporation should not be able to
object if, for instance, a large amount of its
income is apportioned to a market state —
much larger than what the three-factor
formula would permit. Of course, most states
are also origin states, so a single-sales-factor
state should not be able to use equitable
apportionment to undo a result that
apportions much of a domestic corporation’s
income to a market state.
That explains what equitable
apportionment should not do in the age of
single sales factor, but what should it do? For
one, equitable apportionment should continue
to do many things it has always done, such as
permitting taxpayers or administrators to
15
separate lines of business in some cases.
Further, equitable apportionment should be
used in cases in which there is something
anomalous going on as to the location of sales
without consideration of the location of the
other factors.
For example, consider the Colorado district
court’s analysis in Target Brands Inc. v.

14

Or, as a leading casebook puts it, the retail sales tax is
structurally flawed. Walter Hellerstein et al., State and Local
Taxation, at 655 (10th ed. 2014).
15

See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Franchise Tax Board, 139 P.3d 1169
(Cal. 2006) (permitting calculating receipts from treasury function
differently from other business functions for purposes of the sales
factor).
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16

Department of Revenue. Because the taxpayer,
an intangible holding company, had no factors
in Colorado, it owed no CIT, which was an
anomalous result given the large royalties it
earned from the use of its intellectual property
in Colorado. The court permitted the state to
17
invoke section 18. The state proposed an
alternative apportionment method in which it
would rely on the sales factor — and only the
sales factor — of the parent corporation,
Target. Of course, as the court noted, use of just
the sales factor would not give any credit to the
contributions that the holding company
employees made to the production of income;
thus, the court found the alternative
18
unreasonable.
From our perspective, the court’s holding on
this issue was half right. For part of the period in
question, Colorado used a traditional three-factor
formula. As to that period, at least in the abstract,
the court’s analysis seems correct. Yet for the last
tax year under review, the state had moved to
single sales factor. Once the state had already
shifted to single sales factor, we do not think that
evaluating its alternative formula based on
whether every factor’s contribution was fairly
assessed is relevant. The state had decided that
only the location of sales matters, and that is what
both the state and taxpayers should then have to
live with. Thus, for the tax year when Colorado

used single sales factor, we think — at least in
theory19 — that Colorado’s proposed alternative
was reasonable.
A new approach to equitable apportionment
is just one result that follows from reconceiving
the state corporate income tax as a flawed
consumption tax.20 We plan to explore others in
future articles. One particularly important
question is: Given that most states now have at
least21 two deeply flawed consumption taxes,
what would it take for states to make
incremental steps toward better taxing
consumption overall?22


16

Target Brands Inc. v. Department of Revenue, No. 2015CV33831
(Denver Dist. Ct. filed Jan. 27, 2017).
17

Permitting the state to use equitable apportionment at all is
controversial because the Colorado statute would seem to
apportion all income from royalties to the origin state because the
income was from the sale of intangible property. See Clark R.
Calhoun and Matt P. Hedstrom, “Target Brands: Both the Best and
Worst Alternative Apportionment Analysis Yet,” Bloomberg BNA,
Apr. 19, 2017. We understand why that is a close issue, as it was in
Vodafone, but in Target Brands, unlike Vodafone, we think there was
another factor that weighed in the court’s decision. Target is
(primarily) in the business of selling tangible personal property,
and as such its sales are subject to the usual apportionment rules.
Target Brands was a holding company for Target’s intellectual
property. Those holding companies, as the court observed in
passing, are a well-known tool for tax avoidance. See Target Brands
at *80 (citing Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, Holding Intellectual Property,
39 Ga. L. Rev. 1155, 1157 (2005) (the IP holding company tax
avoidance scheme “has been widely and quietly utilized in the last
twenty years”)). We are not claiming that the use of a holding
company had no legitimate business purpose, but we are observing
that using equitable apportionment essentially to treat a taxpayer
as in the business it is in appears as an easier case than a case like
Vodafone. Vodafone is in the business of selling other than tangible
property; and it did not alter its business structure to make it
appear (in part) otherwise.
18

Target Brands at *83.
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19

Target Brands is a complicated case with complicated facts. It
could well be that the state’s alternative is not reasonable in this
case given facts that we are not considering. Our concern is wholly
with the theoretical question whether relying on only the sales
factor is reasonable once the state has shifted to use of the single
sales factor.
20

For those who want to dig deeper into equitable
apportionment questions, see Shanske, “Equitable Apportionment
and the State Corporate Income Tax: Past, Present and Possible
Future,” forthcoming. Please contact author for working draft.
21

Gross receipts taxes might be viewed as a third form of
deeply flawed consumption tax within the few states that levy
gross receipts and similar taxes.
22

For some of our prior academic work on why it is in the
national interest for state governments to better tax consumption
through firm and vendor level taxes, see, e.g., Gamage and Shanske,
“Tax Cannibalization and Fiscal Federalism in the United States,”
111 Northwestern University Law Review 295, at 362-369 (2017)
(arguing that the federal government should assist state
governments in improving their vendor- and firm-level
consumption taxes); and Gamage, “The Case for Taxing (All of)
Labor Income, Consumption, Capital Income, and Wealth,” 68 Tax
Law Review 355 (2015) (arguing that the U.S. tax system should
include a vendor- or firm-level consumption tax — like a valueadded tax).
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